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In this paper, we report the findings from an interview survey on the system and 
process of lending decisions and loan pricing, as well as the information that is used in 
such processes. The survey targeted 19 regional financial institutions, including regional 
banks and cooperative institutions in Japan. We found that soft information is used in 
lending decisions but is rarely used directly in loan pricing, and found that each branch 
exercises greater discretion in loan pricing. Soft information affects loan pricing 
indirectly through each bank’s internal credit rating process. Loan officers at a bank 
usually revise the financial statements submitted by client firms using soft information 
in order to more accurately reflect the actual conditions.       
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1.  Introduction 
In general, many unlisted small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) prepare 
financial statements to be filed with their tax returns.  Since such statements are 
intended to reduce the amount that a business will pay in taxes, they do not always 
reflect the actual condition of the business.  In lending to a firm, it is essential for a 
bank to monitor how a firm will use and repay the funds.    However, without an on-site 
audit of a firm, a bank may not be able to monitor how borrowed funds are being used; 
therefore, banks need to observe cash flow, which includes collections and payments of 
trade credit, correctly and timely for the confirmation of repayment sources.  As a 
result, prospective lenders must require that firms complete additional documents 
through bilateral negotiations with the firms that will lead to a realistic understanding of 
firm’s financial condition and interview personnel of the firm to obtain pertinent 
unrecorded information.  In this sense, investing substantial time to establish 
relationships with borrowers, primarily through a bank’s loan officers, is more 
important when lending to small and medium-sized enterprises than to larger firms.   
Whether soft (qualitative) information, such as that concerning managerial talent 
and employee morale, affects the management of a firm is difficult to measure 
quantitatively although a casual observation suggests that such soft information is 
important in credit decisions.  If such information is proved to be important, then the 
manner in which a bank collects and uses such information should be  examined.  Any 
information collected in the manner described above is subjective.  Therefore, bank 
loan officers may not always be consistent in their interpretation of such subjective 
information.  Thus, the proper utilization of soft information requires both the bank’s 
loan officers’ individual monitoring ability (their ability to evaluate clients’ business)  
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and its organizational system to manage efficiently the information obtained.  When 
verifiable hard information does not provide a clear view for a firm’s actual financial 
standing, soft information has more value in the loan process.  In fact, the empirical 
literature is supportive of this hypothesis.  Many of these studies assume such 
variables as the duration of the lending relationship, the scope of the relationship, the 
lender-borrower distance, the lender size, and the frequency of a loan officer’s visits to a 
borrower (or the frequency of a loan officer turnover) as proxy variables for the 
relationship strength and shed light on these variables’ effects on loan approvable 
decisions and loan terms.  The results of these studies not only reveal the importance 
of relationships for lending to SMEs but also provide important implications about 
competition in credit markets and the existence of small community lenders.  Most 
studies in the literature, however, resort to quantitative analysis with imperfect 
understanding of actual steps taken toward finalizing a loan; thus, it is unclear in the 
real world what soft information is indeed emphasized and how it is utilized.     
A bank is willing to collect accurate information about the creditworthiness of a 
borrowing firm only if the expected increase in the return from lending to the firm 
exceeds the cost of information acquisition.  However, it is hard to estimate the 
expected value of such an increase in the return without obtaining accurate information 
beforehand.  Establishing a bank-firm relationship helps a bank overcome this 
dilemma.    Thus, the bank-firm relationship, which facilitates a smooth loan supply and 
a secure repayment, is a prerequisite for a bank to ensure stable profitability.   
It would have been difficult for Japanese banks, which had excessively relied on land 
(real estate) as collateral for loans during the “bubble” period of the late 1980s, to 
develop their abilities to properly evaluate the creditworthiness of businesses and to  
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build bank-firm relationships when they were under pressure to reduce the large number 
of non-performing loans and comply with capital adequacy regulations.   An important 
question is what factors affect the incentives of banks to form close relationships with 
borrowing firms.  The relationship between an SME and a bank depends on the 
attitudes of each responsible loan officer at a lending branch and/or its manager and on 
the branch manager’s lending policy.  If they understand the importance of stable 
bank-firm relationships and make efforts to aggressively collect information, the result 
would likely be the effective use of soft information and the improved availability of 
funds.  On the other hand, if they do not perceive the necessity for such relationships, 
bank-firm relationships would inevitably become destabilized.  Therefore, the lack of 
bank-firm relationships and the resulting deterioration of the capacity to evaluate the 
quality of businesses do not necessarily come from the deteriorating abilities of loan 
officers and/or branch managers.  If banks give less priority on the development of 
such abilities due to changes in external environments, they reduce efforts to develop 
these abilities. 
Thus, in light of the extant literature, it is important to clarify the factors that provide 
incentives for loan officers and branch managers to collect information and maintain 
close relationships with their borrowers, in addition to the concrete content of the 
information to which banks attach importance when making decisions for lending to 
SMEs.  
In this paper, we intend to clarify the organizational structure and the 
decision-making authority for credit decisions using information collected from 
interviews with Japanese bank personnel.  We emphasize how soft information is 
collected and utilized when making loan approval and loan pricing decisions.  The  
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information was obtained from interviews conducted at 19 banks (regional banks, 
regional banks II, and shinkin banks)
1  in 7 prefectures.    Banks to be interviewed were 
selected from various classes of bank size and from    regions and markets with various 
level of competitiveness. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section  2  deals with empirical 
questions that are difficult to quantify in relationship banking, particularly those related 
to the impact of the allocation of the decision authority.  Section 3 contains a 
description of our interview survey, including its objectives, the selection of survey 
subjects, and the questions asked.  Sections 4, 5, and 6 provide details of the 
information collected, namely, the credit-decision system (Section 4), the loan-pricing 
system (Section 5), and the ways to build a customer relationship and to collect and 
store client information (Section 6) by type of bank (regional or shinkin banks).  In 
Section 7, the conclusion, remaining issues for further studies and the prospective 
directions for future research are presented. 
 
2.  Economic Theory on the Organizational Structure of Lending Decisions and 
Development of Empirical Questions 
2.1. Relationship Banking 
Small and medium-sized firms that are not publicly traded suffer from the problem 
of asymmetric information or the agency problem more severely than larger listed firms 
since the former are more uncertain in their performance and are informationally opaque 
because of the limited requirement for information disclosure.  Based on this premise, 
                                                  
1  Banks belonging to the Association of Regional Banks are called regional banks, and those belonging to the 
Second Association of Regional Banks are called regional banks II in Japan.    The latter are smaller in size.    Shinkin 
banks (Shin’yo Kinko) are local cooperative financial institutions.    
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a large number of theoretical studies have been proposed to show the economic 
rationality of the various types of contracts or transaction customs in the practice of 
small business financing by applying the economics of information and the contract 
theory. Relationship banking, the long-term and multi-dimensional relationship between 
a bank and a firm, has been of interest to researchers for a long time.   
Earlier theoretical studies focused on the possibility that long-term relationships 
facilitate an intertemporal implicit contract to induce the incentive of borrowers (Stiglitz 
and Weiss 1983; Bolton and Scharfstein 1990; Boot and Thakor 1994).    These theories 
predict that a bank can capture borrowers with a good credit history by committing to 
refuse to lend if the borrower has failed to repay in the past but to loan at a rate lower 
than the competitive rate if the borrower has successfully repaid in the past.  The 
possibility of a long-term relationship enables this implicit contract and encourages the 
bank to provide a loan to a firm new to the credit market, since the bank can expect the 
borrowers' appropriate effort to repay.
2  
A bank that maintains a long-term relationship with a firm can accumulate 
proprietary information through repeated transactions with the firm. For example, 
several studies empirically report the possibility that a bank can exclusively obtain 
real-time information about the creditworthiness of a firm by closely monitoring 
transactions on the checking account if a firm places all of its checking accounts at the 
bank with which it maintains the closest relationship (Fama 1985; Nakamura 1993; 
                                                  
2 In relation to this theory, Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that the long-term relationship improves the credit 
availability measured by the percentage of trade credit repaid late and the percentage of early payment discounts that 
are taken by the firm from the National Small Business Financing Survey.  Berger and Udell (1995) find that the 
interest rate is lower and the collaterals are less likely to be pledged if a firm maintains a long-term relationship with a 
lender from a dataset containing line-of-credit contracts collected from the same survey.  Elsas and Krahnen (1998) 
also find a positive correlation between the credit availability and the length of a bank-firm relationship.   
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Nakamura, Mester, and Renault 2008; Norden and Weber 2010).  It is also well-known 
that a bank can earn an excess return despite the lending competition if it has 
proprietary information that is not accessible to rival banks (Greenbaum, Kanatas, and 
Venezia 1989; Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992; von Thadden 2004).  For example, let us 
consider the situation in which banks are competing for lending to a firm and a bank 
among them has exclusive access to proprietary information about the creditworthiness 
of the firm.  The bank with the information advantage can economize the cost of the 
error to accept a loan application from a firm lacking in repayment ability or the error to 
withhold one from a firm with sufficient potential to repay.  Furthermore, the bank 
with less accurate information would be expected likely to accept a loan application 
from a firm with a negative prospect that was rejected by a more informed bank.  For 
these reasons, the more informed bank can expect a larger return than a less informed 
one at any level of an offered interest rate.  The informed bank can earn the rent from 
this cost advantage, whereas the less informed one can expect no more than a zero 
return.
3  In addition to this theory, there is a model in which relationship banking is 
defined by the costly proactive information acquisition by a bank, e.g., assigning a loan 
officer to each borrower (Hauswald and Marquez 2006).     
An informed bank can also differentiate its services by taking advantage of the 
informational advantage.  If the bank can determine temporary from permanent 
financial distress of a firm from the proprietary information at hand, then the bank can 
earn an excess return by establishing the reputation that it is willing to flexibly respond 
                                                  
3 The loan interest rate in this case is higher than that in a case in which every bank can observe the proprietary 
information, and, therefore, the payoff to the entrepreneur of the firm is reduced because of this informational 
asymmetry among competing banks.  Rajan (1992) points out the possibility that the entrepreneur who expects this 
sort of hold-up problem reduces his management efforts below the socially optimal level.    
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to renegotiations with firms under a temporary liquidity shortage (Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri 1994; Dinç 2000).    The bank can also provide more effective consultation for 
its borrower to improve its creditworthiness.  Boot and Thakor (2000) characterize 
relationship banking as a consulting service and show that this accompanying service 
facilitates the differentiation from the rivals and generates an excess return.   
  
2.2. The Theoretical Nature of Proprietary Information: Soft Information 
What characteristics is the proprietary information assumed to hold in theoretical 
models of relationship banking?  First, proprietary information is the information that 
is not publicly available and is available only through direct contact with each borrower.   
In other words, by its very nature, it is private information.  Among private 
information on the creditworthiness of a borrowing firm, the transaction documents of 
its checking account, timely financial statements, the firm owner's private assets/debts, 
his family structure, and his carrier history are verifiable to the third party by 
quantitative data or legal documents.  In contrast, the manager's enthusiasm for his 
business, managerial competence, status/influence/reputation in the industry or the 
region, and future potential needs for funds are unverifiable by a third party since there 
are no objective documents or quantitative data on these factors.  Verifiable 
information is relatively easy to transmit credibly to a bank that is new to the borrower 
if the borrower decides to do so because the borrower can show objective proof for the 
information.  However, unverifiable information is relatively difficult to transmit 
credibly to a bank since the borrower cannot prove its accuracy and it requires that the 
bank new to the borrower make an effort to determine its accuracy.  Therefore, 
unverifiable information is more likely to be held exclusively by a bank that maintains a  
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long relationship and becomes the source of the excess return that results from 
information advantage.    Theoretical studies generally call such private and unverifiable 




Figure 1: Type of private information 
 
2.3. Allocation of the Lending-Decision Authority and the Use of Soft Information   
Soft information can be difficult to transmit not only among organizations but also 
within each organization.  For example, a loan officer at a branch usually collects 
information about a potential borrower's creditworthiness, including soft information, in 
the process of making a lending decision.  If the decision authority is granted to the 
branch, then it is more likely that the soft information collected by the loan officer is 
made use of in the lending decision because it is relatively easier to share the soft 
information within a branch office.  However, if the decision authority is held by the 
head office, the loan officer has to document and transmit the soft information to the 
head office.  In the process of this information transmission, the soft information is 
likely to be ignored by the head office because of lack of verification.  Thus, the 












important determinant for the extent of the utilization of soft information in making a 
lending decision or the loan officer's incentive to collect soft information, as assumed in 
the theory of relationship banking.     
More concretely, several theoretical studies predict that a decentralized organization, 
in which the decision authority is granted to the agent who engages in collecting 
information, including soft information, is more likely to use soft information in 
decision making than a centralized organization, in which the central principal holds the 
decision authority (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Berger and Udell 2002; Stein 2002).    The 
agent can make use of soft information that he collects by himself in order to maximize 
his own payoff.  Therefore, the agent is more willing to collect soft information in a 
more decentralized organization; as a result, a bank with a decentralized structure can 
enjoy a comparative advantage in providing relationship banking.  In addition to this 
theory, Dessein (2002) shows the possibility that the central principal strategically 
delegates the decision authority to the agent despite the expected agency cost resulting 
from the discrepancy between the agent’s objective and the principal’s, if the benefit of 
the information advantage of the agent is greater than the cost of this discrepancy.     
 
2.4. Qualitative Empirical Questions 
A number of empirical studies have already been conducted on the theories reported 
above.
4  However, for the evaluation of the plausibility of the assumptions in these 
                                                  
4 Several empirical studies, using survey data of small business financing in the U.S. and Japan, find that smaller banks 
tend to maintain closer relationships with their borrowers and that their share of loans to small business among total 
loans tends to be higher than that of larger banks (Cole, Goldberg, and White 2004; Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, and 
Stein 2005; Uchida, Udell, and Watanabe 2008). In addition, Benvenuti, Casolaro, Del Prete, and Mistrulli (2010), on 
the basis of survey data targeting Italian banks, find that banks that allocate more loan decision authority to branch loan 
officers maintain a higher share of small business loans among total loans even after controlling for the size of each 
bank. A couple of recent empirical studies used internal loan evaluation data of a certain commercial bank. Liberti and  
11 
 
theories in the context of small business financing, empirical questions that are not 
necessarily suitable to quantitative analyses or questions that require preliminary fact 
finding before collecting quantitative data still remain.   
First of all, the theory of relationship banking assumes that banks can make a 
lending decision and quote a loan rate discretionally according to soft information and 
miscellaneous competitive conditions.  However, we cannot completely deny the 
possibility that some banks may make a lending decision and quote a rate automatically 
by rule according to the internal credit rating rather than by discretion.  Second, if 
lending decisions and loan pricing are discretionary, then the level in the financial 
institution that exercises such discretion and how that decision authority is allocated by 
each bank’s internal rule must be clarified.    Third, we do not have accurate information 
on what types of information are used in the decision at each level of the 
lending-decision process.  Furthermore, it is not clear whether the concept of soft 
information is well suited to Japanese lending customs.  Lastly, we need to conduct 
some preliminary fact finding before collecting quantitative data for a statistical analysis 
regarding how loan officers collect and accumulate information in practice and how the 
intensity of the information acquisition is related to the allocation of decision authority 
in each bank.  The interview survey was designed to reveal answers to the qualitative 
                                                                                                                                                  
Mian (2009) find that soft information is more frequently used in loan decisions if it can be finalized within a branch by 
rule but is less likely to be used if the final decision authority is held by the head office. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) 
find that a bank tends to allocate more decision authority to branches geographically distant from the head office and 
that these branches collect soft information more intensively and enjoy lower loan delinquency rates and longer lending 
relationships.  Besides these empirical studies on the decision structure, several empirical studies find that soft 
information is significantly useful for the credit rating of firms (Grunert, Norden, and Weber 2005; Nakamura and 
Roszbach 2010).   It is also statistically found from the internal data of a foreign bank operating in Argentina that the 
loan officer rotation improves the incentive for them to report “bad” news about their clients to their bank (Hertzberg, 





3.  Interview Survey of Financial Institutions: Outline of Survey Procedures and 
Results 
The interview survey was conducted in order to understand the actual flow in which 
the loans for SMEs are processed and reveal how qualitative information is used in the 
process.    At the same time, we investigated the effects of the difference in the category 
of loan applicants on the flow of credit decision, the approval or disapproval of loan 
applications, and the decision on loan terms.    Specific issues surveyed are listed below:   
  Credit-decision system 
・ Decision-making  structure  in the lending decision. 
・  Organizational structure of the credit department; segments by clients’ sector and 
number of staff members.   
・  Scope of decision-making authority; amount of loan, interest rate, and other loan 
terms at the levels of the loan officers, the branch section manager, the deputy 
branch manager, the branch manager, the credit department at the head office, the 
board of directors, and the president. 
＊  Examples of specific cases submitted to the board of directors and/or the 
president. 
＊  Ratio of loan decisions finalized at the head office and at the branch office. 
＊  Development and background of the organizational structure and 
decision-making authority seen in time series and decisive factors of 
decision-making. 
  Method of determining the credit-decision and lending stance  
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・  Degree of dominance of the head office in policy implementation and degree of 
discretion allowed to a branch manager and a loan officer. 
・  Methods of setting operational objectives or lending targets at each branch office. 
・  Staff transfer cycle and job position succession system.  Effects of staff transfer 
on the credit-decision policy. 
  Acquisition of new clients and classification of loan applicants for management 
purposes 
・  Differentiation between new and existing clients in loan decisions and pricing. 
・  Differentiation between clients for whom the bank is the main bank and other 
clients.  
・  Differentiation between clients who transact with multiple banks and other clients. 
・  Differentiation of client companies according to size, type of business, region, and 
number of loans. 
  Lending-decision process 
・  Time needed from loan application to loan execution. 
・  Documents submitted by the corporate client (obligatory or voluntary). 
  Decision process of lending and its terms; amount of loan, interest rate, maturity, 
and repayment schedule. 
・ Credit  examination. 
・  Method of credit rating and specific information. 
・  Importance of quantitative and qualitative information in credit decisions. 
＊  Contents of qualitative information to be considered in credit decisions.   
・  Relative importance of security and criteria for requiring security. 




＊  Use of the public credit guarantee system. 
・  Correlation among the amount of loan, interest rate, maturity, repayment schedule, 
and security (interest rate setting matrix). 
・  Consideration of administrative and capital costs in interest rate setting. 
＊  Is the capital cost of a bank taken into account in loan pricing? 
＊  To what extent are administrative costs identified and how are they assigned 
proportionately to loan pricing? 
・  Effects of competition with other banks. Negotiation process and number of 
negotiation meetings. 
・  To what extent is total profitability, the opportunity for the cross-selling of 
products (profitability including fee income), taken into account when setting an 
interest rate? 
  How has the introduction of the Financial Inspection Manual published by the 
Financial Service Agency changed the credit decision? 
  Meaning of relationship banking and its relative importance. 
・  What has changed as a result of the Financial Services Agency’s policy of placing 
importance on relationship banking?   
・  What are the decisive factors (e.g., length of business relationship, share of 
business, scope of relationship, information provided by client, and involvement 
in corporate governance) in determining the depth of relationships? 
・  How are banks building customer relationships? 
・  Specifically, what positive effects (e.g., lower transaction cost and expansion of 
auxiliary transactions) will relationship banking have on a lender?    
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  Information gathering and storage system. 
・  Method of information collecting and storing system. 
・  Number of corporate clients covered by each loan officer and average number of 
visits per corporate client. 
  Method of acquiring new clients. 
  Diversified forms of lending. 
・  Handling of credit-score lending and related problems. 
＊  Are there clearly defined criteria that make a distinction between 
relationship-type loans and transaction-type loans? 
・  Current situation of loans secured by inventory and accounts receivable and its 
future possibilities. 
・  Current situation of syndicated loans and securitization and future issues. 
  Human resources development. 
・  Succession of information gathering and evaluation know-how and techniques. 
・  Introduction of an incentive system for loan officers. 
  Expectations for public support, including a public credit guarantee and support 
of government-owned financial institutions. 
・  Effects of the shift from full to partial guarantee of the public credit guarantee 
system. 
 
The selection of the financial institutions covered by the interview survey was limited 
to regional financial institutions, regional banks, regional banks II, and shinkin banks, 
which are considered to place importance on relationship banking.  Although we tried 
to make a geographical selection from the viewpoint of whether a region has a  
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competitive loan market or a concentrated loan market, we selected a total of 19 
financial institutions operating in competitive markets located in and around the 
metropolitan areas of central Tokyo, the Tama areas of Tokyo, Kanagawa (Yokohama 
and Odawara), Chiba, and Shizuoka and those in the concentrated markets of Toyama 
and Shiga.    The list of financial institutions surveyed is as follows: 
Regional banks: Chiba Bank, Hokuriku Bank, Shiga Bank, Shizuoka Bank, and 
Yokohama Bank (5 banks). 
Regional banks II: Keiyo Bank, Shizuoka Chuo Bank, and Tokyo Tomin Bank (3 
banks). 
Shinkin banks: Asahi Shinkin Bank, Johoku Shinkin Bank, Kawasaki Shinkin Bank, 
Mishima Shinkin Bank, Ome Shinkin Bank, Sagami Shinkin Bank, Seibu 
Shinkin Bank, Sugamo Shinkin Bank, Tama Shinkin Bank, Tokyo Higashi 
Shinkin Bank, and Yokohama Shinkin Bank (11 banks).   
 
The manager, section chief, and assistant section chief of the credit department at 
each financial institution responded to the interview survey; in some financial 
institutions, they were accompanied by staff members of the loan planning department, 
the management planning department, and the sales  department.  Each  interview  took, 
on average, more than 3 hours. In order to minimize the possible bias in interviewees’ 
subjected opinions, we requested the disclosure of objective materials, such as in-house 
manuals and data.    Almost half of the financial institutions agreed to provide them. 
 
 
4.    Credit-decision System and Lending-decision Process  
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4.1. Regional Banks 
(i) Credit-decision System 
      The credit-decision organization at a head office is larger at a regional bank than 
at a shinkin bank.    The number of staffers in the departments of a major regional bank 
who are involved in credit decisions is about 100, which is more than twice as many as 
that of a major shinkin bank.  The functions of the credit department are largely 
divided into credit decision and credit management.  Loan applications may be 
evaluated under a two-layered system, one on the basis of each individual loan 
application and the other on the basis of each client.  In addition, loan applications by 
firms in industries that are considered to carry higher risks, such as the real estate sector, 
are cautiously evaluated at several financial institutions. 
 
(ii) Decision-making Authority 
 The upper limit of loan approval authority of the branch manager depends on 
factors such as the credit rating of the loan applicant, the rank of the branch, including 
whether or not an executive officer is appointed as the branch manager, and the 
availability of collateralizable assets.  In the case of a regional bank in a major 
metropolitan area, which competes with mega-banks, the decision-making authority of 
the branch manager in terms of the total credit amount is 1-2 billion yen.    On the other 
hand, the loan approval authority of the branch manager of a regional bank located in a 
region where it barely faces the competition with mega-banks is much smaller, about 
200-300 million yen.
5  We also found a regional bank that assigns the decision 
authority of 100-200 million yen even at a branch in which an executive officer is 
                                                  
5  It is noteworthy, however, that it is not clear whether the amount is measured by that of unsecured 
credit or by that of total credit.  
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appointed as a branch manager, which is comparable to a larger shinkin bank.    At some 
regional banks II, a branch manager has little decision-making authority.  Within a 
branch, the extent of the authority to establish loan terms is delegated to a loan officer 
by the branch manager.    Regarding packaged products, the decision may be made by a 
loan officer without the branch manager’s involvement. 
The ratio of the number of decisions made by branches and those made by the head 
office varies widely at large regional banks.  At some regional banks, most decisions 
are made at branches, whereas the head office makes the final decision with regard to 
one half of the loan applications.  However, at other banks, nearly 70 to 80% of 
decisions are made at the head office.  Although decisions are made at branch offices 
as frequently as at the head office, the head office makes an overwhelmingly large 
proportion (about 90%) of decisions on the basis of the total amount of loans. 
The delegation of decision-making authority to branch managers at major regional 
banks in major metropolitan areas expanded in 2004.    More decision-making authority 
is delegated to branch managers at major regional banks in rural areas because of the 
advanced credit risk management and the intention to reinforce relationship banking.  
It is natural to assume that the focus on relationship banking is a direct response to the 
Financial Services Agency’s prudential policy.  It can also be part of the strategy of 
product differentiation in the face of intensified competition with mega-banks and 
regional banks entering the local market from nearby prefectures.  These regional 
banks may aim at stopping the advance of mega-banks by gaining greater advantage in 
information acquisition through relationship banking.  There is no change in the 
authority of branch managers at banks that are historically not viewed as competitors 
with mega-banks.  It is noteworthy that, while branch managers are given more  
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authority at large regional banks that compete with mega-banks, the authority of branch 
managers at smaller regional banks, which compete with shinkin banks and regional 
banks II, has not been expanded. 
 
(iii) Organizational Structure of the Head Office and Branch Offices and the Speed 
of Processing Loan Applications 
At a branch of a regional bank, loan proposals are circulated typically in three tiers 
from a loan officer to a loan manager and from the loan manager to a branch manager, 
or in four tiers, which include a deputy branch manager.  At large regional banks, a 
block is set up for each geographical group of branches and the block head office in 
order to oversee branch offices in each block.    A credit decision by the block manager 
may be conducted before a loan proposal is submitted to the credit department at the 
head office.   
The credit-decision system at the head office is layered in several tiers based on 
ranks within the credit department and executive officers.  The number of decision 
tiers ranges from three to seven.    If a loan is too complicated and risky to be approved 
by an individual reviewer, such as a director of the credit department and an executive 
officer, it is reviewed at a managerial committee meeting (this is sometimes called a 
loan review meeting or a managing director meeting).  Whether or not a loan is 
reviewed by a committee is determined on the basis of the size of the loan or the 
combination of size of the loan and the internal credit rating of the applicant.  
Sometimes, loan applications with serious negative impacts on a bank, such as negative 
rumors, are discussed at the meeting.  The number of days varies between new and 
existing customers.  The lending decision for a new customer requires more time than  
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that for an existing customer.    Regarding a new customer, the preliminary evaluation in 
advance of the formal credit decision may take from one week to three months. 
 
(iv)  Personnel  Rotation   
Loan officers are rotated at an interval of 3-5 years, and branch managers are rotated 
at approximately 2-year intervals at regional banks.  This practice is used to prevent 
collusion with clients and also to give loan officers the opportunity to meet more clients. 
 
(v)    Setting Goals for Branch Offices 
Goals for branches are set for total earnings and total loan values.  Individual 
officers are not commended for achieving these goals so as to prevent excessive 
expansion in loan volume. 
 
4.2. Shinkin Banks 
(i)  Credit-decision  System 
There is a wide difference in the scale of the credit-decision organization among 
shinkin banks of similar size.  The group composition of the credit-decision 
organization also varies among shinkin banks.    At some banks, credit decision and risk 
management units are set within the credit department.  At other banks, the two are 
established as separate departments.  Some shinkin banks have a business evaluation 
unit that screens on the basis of an applicant’s technology rather than on collateral or 
financial position.   
Moreover, some shinkin banks have the function of supporting the rehabilitation of 
firms carrying high credit risk and giving management advice to these clients in  
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addition to making credit decisions regarding ordinary loan applications, planning a 
lending scheme, and managing non-performing loans.  Some shinkin banks have 
already adopted a credit-decision system differentiated by the industrial sector of 
applicants. 
 
(ii)  Decision-making  Authority 
The decision-making authority of the branch manager is determined on the basis of 
the rank of a branch at some but not all shinkin banks.  The  decision-making  authority 
may be established in accordance with the branch manager’s rank.  The extent to 
which decision-making authority is delegated to branch managers varies from bank to 
bank. 
Some shinkin banks set the scope of the decision-making authority based on data 
from a three-dimensional matrix consisting of the rank of a branch, the amount of 
unsecured credit, and the total loan value.  Other banks set the criteria for the 
delegation of authority on the basis of three categories, debtors, total credit, and amount 
of unsecured credit; two, total loan value and unsecured credit; or one, only on the total 
loan value.    Moreover, decisions on loans for red-light district business operators and a 
firm with non-performing and probably non-recoverable loans are made at the head 
office at some banks.   
The upper limit of the decision-making authority on the total loan value by a branch 
manager is set at 100 million yen or more at some shinkin banks, while other banks set 
it at 50 million yen or more or around 30 million yen.  As already pointed out, 
regarding the decision-making authority, in addition to the standard for total credit 
amount, the standards are usually set for the unsecured credit amount, which excludes  
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the amount covered by collateral and the amount guaranteed by the Credit Guarantee 
Corporation.  The ratio of the upper limit for the amount of unsecured credit to the 
upper limit for total loan value varies among banks.  While, at most banks, the upper 
limit of unsecured credit is around 10 percent of that of the total loan value, it can reach 
as high as 30 percent.    Even though the decision-making authority of branch managers 
has been expanding in response to intensified competition, at some banks, it has been 
diminishing or has remained invariant.  The ratio of decision making on loans of the 
head office and branches is 50:50 at most banks.  Banks that delegate large 
decision-making authority to branch managers generally show a higher percentage of 
loans approved at the branch, although there are some exceptions.     
 
(iii)  Organizational Structure of the Head Office and Branch Offices and the 
Speed of Processing Loan Applications 
At a branch of a shinkin bank, loan proposals are circulated in four tiers, i.e., from a 
loan officer to a loan manager, then to a deputy branch manager, and then to a branch 
manager, and the hierarchical structure is not much simpler than that at regional banks.   
The decision-making authority at the head office is structured into four to seven tiers, 
including ranks within a credit department and executive officers.    The credit-decision 
structure at a head office of shinkin banks is also not much simpler than that at regional 
banks.  If individuals, such as staffers at a credit department, the director of a 
department, and executive officers, cannot make a decision regarding a loan application, 
the application is reviewed at the executive committee meeting.  The criteria for 
holding the executive committee meeting (credit-decision meeting) depend either on 
both the loan amount and rating or on the loan amount alone.  Some banks have a  
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two-tiered committee system. 
As explained above, the hierarchical structure of a credit-decision system consisting 
of branch offices, the head office, and the executive committee meeting at shinkin banks 
is not simpler than that at regional banks.  Although the credit-decision system at 
regional banks includes more staff members, it is not because its structure is more 
complex but because regional banks have to deal with a greater number of loan 
applications.   
The number of days required between a loan application and a loan approval 
decision varies among shinkin banks.    It ranges from one day, two to three days, three 
to five days, three days to two weeks, and three days to three weeks.  At some banks, 
the credit decision is completed in a longer period for new customers than for existing 
customers, and the speed of the credit decision can differ depending on whether it is 
conducted at a branch or at the head office.  Although there is little difference in the 
speed of the lending decision among existing customers, the decision for new customers 
can take a longer period.  The preliminary examination of loans for purchasing 
equipment normally takes two to three days if the plan is simple, but it requires one to 
two weeks if the plan includes the construction of a building. 
 
(iv)  Personnel  Rotation 
   At shinkin  banks, branch managers are on a rotation of about three years, 
whereas loan officers are on a rotation of no more than two years.  In some cases, 
switches of loan officers have larger impacts on lending and credit-decision attitudes.  




(v)    Setting Goals for the Branch Office 
Goals are set for both the net operating income (a measure of management 
efficiency), and the amount of deposits and loans(a measure of volume), not at the 
individual level but at the branch level. 
  
5.  Loan  Pricing  System 
5.1. Regional Banks 
(i)    Setting the Internal Baseline Rate for Each Loan 
Many regional banks set the internal “baseline rate” for each loan by summing up 
the credit-risk cost, the capital cost; profit margin required by share holders of the bank, 
and the short-term prime rate. Some banks use the sum of the funding cost and the 
administrative cost per unit of funds in place of the short-term prime rate.  The 
credit-risk cost is calculated on the basis of the three-dimensional matrix of the internal 
credit rating, the loan maturity, and the ratio of amounts covered by some guarantee or 
collaterals.  Some regional banks add spreads depending on the sector of an applicant 
or the purpose of borrowing fund.  All banks we interviewed, however, pointed out 
that they have to set the rate lower than the “baseline rate” due to competition with 
other banks.   
At all interviewed banks, a branch is not allowed to make a final decision to offer a 
rate lower than the baseline rate.  The branch needs to ask the decision to the credit 
department at the head office.    The head office considers the “total profit margin,” i.e., 
the potential future business expansion, the expected fee incomes from cross-selling 
various services, the yield of deposits, and the potential for transactions with a firm’s 
manager and employees (employee salary transfer accounts, housing loans, etc.) when  
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making a decision of whether or not to approve a sub-baseline-rate loan.   Some banks 
admitted that they might offer low rates in view of future business potentials, aiming at 
gaining the position of a “main bank.”  Thus, although regional banks set baseline 
rates, there is ample room for discretion when applying the baseline rate to actual loan 
pricing. 
 
(ii)    Information Used for Credit Rating 
      When deciding credit ratings, many regional banks use financial data revised on 
the basis of the actual conditions of borrower’s business operations.  These banks 
gather information on the market value of its investments in affiliated firms, accounts 
receivable, the market value of inventory, the cost of sales, and assets personally held by 
the borrower’s manager through routine contacts, and they assess a borrower’s credit 
quality by revising financial data based on this additional information.    Some regional 
banks use qualitative data, such as the concerns about the manager, the successor, the 
business, and the market of a client firm, to check credit standing from a negative point 
of view, for example, by lowering a credit rating by one notch when a certain set of 
qualitative conditions is met.    On the other hand, a small number of regional banks use 
qualitative information, including a manager’s personal asset holdings, profile, abilities, 
and health and a firm’s internal control system, diversification of customers’ segments, 
position in the industry, and market environment, in order to change a credit rating 
positively.  Regional banks II, which serve mainly corporate clients operating on a 
smaller scale than the clientele of regional banks, improve the accuracy of credit ratings 
by utilizing qualitative information.    As a matter of fact, at every interviewed regional 
bank II, qualitative items accounted for 30-40% of items used for credit rating.   
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However, qualitative data are more likely to be assessed subjectively by a loan officer in 
charge, and several regional banks II admitted that establishing the system and the 
technology to objectively assess qualitative information is a future challenge.  Some 
banks pointed out that, while they depend on quantitative data, such as financial data, 
when rating borrowers, they depend more on qualitative data when making a lending 
decision.  
 
(iii)  Additional  Services 
      As part of the non-price competition, many financial institutions are aware of the 
importance of maintaining a stable supply of funds and the ability to provide advice, 
including the introduction of business connections, i.e., “business matching.”  They 
hope that business matching will lead to the exploration of new business opportunities 
for their client and create a demand for new funds.  At some banks, two or more staff 
members managing the information that can be utilized for business matching are 
appointed at each branch. 
  
(iv)  Collateral  and  Guarantee 
Although all regional banks require, in principle, the personal guarantee of a firm’s 
manager in order to avoid a moral hazard, they recognize that it is not sufficient as a 
means of credit security.    The most important means of credit security is the registered 
land pledged as collateral.  In most cases, however, a main bank is the first mortgage 
holder, since the main bank is in the position to know first the availability of 
collateralizable assets.    The public credit guarantee is often used when providing loans 
to firms with a low credit rating, such as small firms and startups, or when providing  
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emergency loans. Many regional banks said that they had been carrying out the same 
credit evaluation and monitoring as for other ordinary loans before the introduction of 
the shared responsibility system.
6  However, a small number of banks admitted that 
their credit evaluation and monitoring had not been adequate when they provided fully 
guaranteed loans before the introduction of such a system. 
 
5.2.  Shinkin Banks 
(i)    Setting the Internal Baseline Rate for Each Loan 
As in the case of regional banks, all shinkin banks interviewed indicated that they set 
the standard rate based on a certain set of rules.  Many banks determine the baseline 
rate by adding the spread predetermined by the three-dimensional matrix predicated on 
three factors, the internal credit rating based on the financial data, the loan maturity, and 
the collateral/guarantee to the lower limit rate, which is the short-term prime rate or the 
sum of the funding cost and the administrative cost per unit of funds.    While the credit 
rating is used to set the baseline rate at all banks, the use of the maturity and the 
coverage of loan security vary from bank to bank.  In setting the baseline rate on the 
basis of the credit rating, many banks determine the spread to be added to the lower 
limit rate, such as the short-term prime rate, by estimating a default probability 
associated with a certain credit rating on the basis of a certain statistical model and the 
expected loss obtained by multiplying the estimated default probability to the recovery 
rate.    At the same time, a few banks set the baseline rate on the basis of the bank-wide 
earnings objective to cover the capital cost of the bank.   
                                                  
6  The shared responsibility system was introduced into the public credit guarantee system on October 
1, 2007.    The ratio of a default loss covered by the public guarantee system decreased from 100% to 
80% by this revision.  
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It is only for loan applicants with a relative low credit rating, in which case banks do 
not face competition with other lenders, that the standard rate can be applied without 
adjustments.  Banks frequently offer a loan rate that is lower than the standard rate to 
loan applicants with a higher credit rating, since there is greater competition with other 
lenders.  At some shinkin banks, such cases account for about 70% of total loan 
transactions.  Nevertheless, the loans provided to loan applicants with a lower credit 
rating at the baseline rate are not necessarily more profitable than those provided to 
applicants with a higher credit rating at a discounted rate, as the banks have to increase 
the loan loss reserve for bad debts and, as a result, the credit cost also increases.    Most 
banks limit the negotiation for the loan rate for a loan to a client up to twice.  The 
reason for this is that further negotiation is considered to negatively affect the mutual 
trust between a bank and a client.    Many banks set the standard rate at a higher level in 
advance, assuming that they will have to offer lower rates in many cases in the face of 
competition with other lenders.  As in the case of regional banks, there is room for 
discretion when actually applying the standard rate to a borrower at shinkin banks. 
At all shinkin banks that we interviewed, a final decision must be made by the credit 
department at the head office when applying a loan rate lower than the standard rate in 
view of competition with other lenders.  In such a case, a loan officer at the branch 
must explain the reasons to the pertinent department at the head office (only in writing 
in many cases), where the qualitative information that is not found in the financial data 
is often used.  The qualitative information includes information about a firm’s 
manager’s ability as well as about the manager’s relatives, his managerial principles, the 
presence of a manager’s successor, history of transactions, conditions of a firm’s main 
business connections, past due accounts receivable, tax arrears, competitiveness in the  
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industry, managerial foundation, such as technological capabilities, local reputation, and 
potential effects of the proposed loan on other transactions (transactions with a 
manager’s relatives and housing loans to a firm’s employees).    In fact, more than 70% 
of sub-baseline-rate loan applications are approved by the head office at many shinkin 
banks. 
 
(ii)    Information Used for Credit Rating 
The financial data used for credit rating is revised on the basis of the actual 
information collected by a loan officer at a branch, who meets with a firm’s manager 
and examines the business condition on site.  In many cases, the data are revised to 
reflect the insufficiency of depreciation, contents of the inventory, long-term 
unrecoverable loans, and loans to a firm’s president.  In fact, many respondents 
indicated that 50 to 70% of the data used for credit decision and for loan pricing were 
qualitative data, especially with regard to small firms.  In addition, it has been 
confirmed that a number of shinkin banks estimate the default rate of small firms by 
incorporating qualitative data into the scoring  model.  The  financial data are revised in 
many cases by consolidating a manager’s personal assets to the firm’s balance sheet.  
The closer the relationship that a bank has with a client, the more accurate information 
that it can obtain that would be useful for revising financial data properly.  In general, 
shinkin banks tend to depend more heavily on qualitative data than regional banks. 
 
(iii)  Additional  Services 
While many shinkin banks think of the so-called “total profitability” that considers 
cross-selling of services other than loans, no banks have introduced a system to strictly  
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manage profitability with respect to each individual client.  However, all banks 
responded that there was virtually no case in which loans were offered at such a low 
interest rate that the credit cost could not be covered.  Most banks responded that, 
when they were in an unfavorable position in the loan rate competition, they would 
resort to the use of non-price means, including maintaining stable relationships and 
providing value-adding services, such as the introduction of customers and experts, 
cooperation in product publicity, and business matching.  These additional services 
include consulting-type services, such as business diagnosis, which contribute to the 
accumulation of data available for credit management.  However, some banks pointed 
out that they had disadvantages over certain services, such as business matching, 
because their area of operation was smaller than that of regional banks.   
 
(iv)  Collateral  and  Guarantee 
   Real estate is often taken as collateral.  However, if a regional bank is a 
borrower’s main bank, its real estate is already pledged as collateral to the bank, and it 
is difficult for a shinkin bank to set collaterals.  Some shinkin banks pointed out that, 
in reality, they are often forced to make uncollateralized loans.  In making corporate 
loans, every bank demands a firm’s representative’s personal guarantee.    This is not to 
ensure the recovery of the funds but to increase an incentive for repayments by clearly 
establishing legal responsibility.  As a rule, most banks do not use the third-party 
guarantee because the recovery of loans from a third party guarantor is difficult.  On 
the other hand, many banks frequently use public credit guarantees.    These banks also 
pointed out that, when loans are covered by the public credit guarantee, credit decisions 
and monitoring tend to be lax even after the introduction of the shared responsibility  
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system.  Some banks use public guarantees as a means of developing new clients.  
However, some banks do not use the public guarantee system unless strongly requested 
by their client because interest rates on loans covered by the public credit guarantee 
tend to be lower and generate only small interest margins. 
 
6.    How to Establish Relationships and Collect and Accumulate Information 
6.1. Regional Banks 
 (i)  Collecting  and  Storing  Information 
      Financial data and qualitative information, such as the ability of a firm’s manager, 
owner funding capability, influence of the firm/owner on the local community, growth 
potential, strengths, industry position, technological level, and reputation of a firm, are 
collected by a branch loan officer or manager for a particularly important client.  A 
loan officer visits  the clients at least once every month and, in some cases, once or 
twice a week.  The number of clients assigned to each loan officer varies from about 
30 to 100.  The information collected in this way had been managed and accumulated 
at each branch until recently, when many leading regional banks introduced a customer 
relationship management (CRM) system under which customer data, including 
qualitative information (e.g., negotiation track records and transaction status), can be 
shared by all branches.  The system is used so that the head office, as well as the 
branch loan officers and managers, has access to the information.  It facilitates the 
efficient transfer of customer information at loan officers’ rotations.   
 
(ii)    Checking Accounts as a Source of Information 
   All banks reported the importance of keeping track of checking accounts.  As  
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the business performance of a small and medium-sized enterprise can change within 3 
to 4 months, checking accounts that enable banks to track the cash flow of their clients 
serve as an important source of information.   
 
6.2. Shinkin Banks 
(i)    Collecting and Storing Information 
   A loan officer of a shinkin bank visits existing clients primarily to collect funds 
and build relationships.  When collecting funds, they collect monthly deposits and 
sales proceeds.  While some banks charge fees to recover their considerable costs, 
others consider it valuable for understanding a client’s needs.  The typical number of 
loan officers at many banks ranges from 20 to 30 percent of the total staff.  The 
number of corporate clients under management of each typical loan officer is 
approximately 40 to 50 clients.  In an area in which the majority of accounts are held 
by individual customers and the number of corporate accounts is small, a loan officer 
may have as few as 10 to 20 corporate clients.  A loan officer visits each corporate 
client at least once monthly and, in some cases, daily.  A branch manager, in addition 
to a loan officer, visits important clients.    The information gathered through these visits 
is maintained in the credit data file prepared for each client.  At many banks, such 
information is managed at the branch level, and a system is set up under which the 
management of information is not interrupted by changes in loan officers.  Although 
financial data are stored in a database that is accessible to all branches at many banks, 





  (ii)    Checking Accounts as a Source of Information   
 Officials at shinkin banks generally believe that account settlement information is 
important for real-time monitoring of cash flow.  As in the case of regional banks, 
shinkin banks regard the presence of a checking account as an indication that the client 
considers the shinkin bank to be his main bank.   
 
7.  Concluding  Remarks 
 In our interviews, the obvious difference by institutional type in the allocation of 
the decision authority was the upper limit of the loan value that can be finalized by a 
branch.  There was no other significant difference in the lending decision process 
among bank types.  In the process of internal credit rating, most financial institutions, 
including shinkin banks, evaluate each borrower on the basis of quantitative hard 
information, and only a small number of financial institutions use qualitative soft 
information.  
    However, a number of financial institutions have replied that they make use of soft 
information (such as firm owner’s personal assets) acquired through a relationship with 
client firms to improve the accuracy of hard information (such as financial statements) 
so as to reflect their actual financial conditions.    In a case in which soft information is 
not used in the internal credit rating, it is not possible for soft information, including 
that regarding a manager’s personality or management philosophy, to affect such loan 
terms as interest rates.  The evaluation by a loan officer or a branch manager 
documented in a preliminary examination (interviews and on-site inspection) prior to 
the submission of the formal loan application and loan proposals circulated for the 
approval of the loan application often include statements based on soft information;  
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however, the most important point to be considered in the credit decision is the 
verification of a borrower’s repayment capacity.   
With respect to a loan application over which a branch manager has full authority, 
including loan pricing, there is room to reevaluate the creditworthiness of an applicant 
based on soft information in addition to internal credit rating.  The discretion by a 
branch manager appears to depend on the criteria of the branch performance evaluation 
at each bank.   
In contrast, in a case in which the credit department at the head office has the final 
authority, soft information is used in the negotiation between a branch and the credit 
department when necessary.  No banks set up a formal rule regarding the type of 
information to be used in this process, and, therefore, the type of information to be used 
is considered to be dependent on the lending stance of each bank.     
In the interview survey, while no financial institution denied the importance of 
qualitative information in the lending decision, there was no institution that admitted 
that such information directly affected loan pricing.  In other words, since reliable 
quantitative hard information is insufficient in SME finance, financial institutions are 
unable to make lending decisions on a loan application without qualitative soft 
information collected through relationship banking.  It is possible that a loan could be 
approved on the basis of qualitative soft information, but it would rarely affect the loan 
pricing and the other terms of the loan.  The officers of the financial institutions 
reported that such practices had become less common after the introduction of the 
internal credit rating system.     
In fact, the internal baseline rate for each client is determined on the basis of the 
three-dimensional matrix of credit ratings, loan maturity, and coverage ratio after taking  
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funding and administrative costs into account at all types of financial institutions.  At 
all financial institutions, the approval by the credit department at the head office is 
required if a branch offers an interest rate lower than the internal baseline rate.  The 
actual offered rate that is proposed by a branch in this case is usually determined in 
reference to the rates offered by the competitors.  There were virtually no cases in 
which the actual offered rate was higher than or equal to the baseline rate except in 
cases in which there were doubts about a firm’s ability to repay.   
If the credit rating of firms based on qualitative soft information is treated as internal 
proprietary information, it is assumed that the loan terms for a main bank applicant (i.e., 
a corporate client in whose loan portfolio the bank has the largest share) are determined 
in a process that is different from that for a non-main bank applicant.  However, no 
financial institution admitted that such differentiation had a direct influence on the 
lending decision and loan pricing.  Rather, the differentiation is made from the 
viewpoint of promoting various financial services, and, as a result, it seems that the 
differentiation between main bank applicants and non-main bank applicants affects loan 
terms through the consideration of cross-selling of services.  As already reported, the 
effective rate appears to be decided in reference to the rates offered by competitors. 
Nevertheless, an increasing number of financial institutions, regional banks in particular, 
are using the interest rate based on total profitability taking into account the return from 
cross-selling services as the lowest rate.  The introduction of the total 
profitability-based rate will strengthen the relation between the scope of banking 
transactions and the breadth of relationships as it expands the leeway for further 
reducing interest rates. 
The advantage for a financial institution of serving as a client’s main bank lies in the  
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fact that it can keep track of the client’s cash flow through the checking account and 
monitor the client’s repayment ability.  The concentration of such transactions at the 
main bank seems likely to affect loan pricing by reducing the transaction cost.  
However, we found no evidence for that in our interviews, although many financial 
institutions admitted that a checking account can signal a liquidity shortage within a 
client firm. 
If proprietary information cannot be reflected in loan pricing, funding costs and 
administrative costs per unit amount of loans become the most important factors in 
lending competition.  In response to this price competition, shinkin banks and other 
small financial institutions are attaching the greatest importance to advisory capability 
to improve their business management of the client.  This is because they intend to be 
chosen by a client as the counter party in financial transactions by gaining advantage in 
non-price competition even though they cannot compete on an equal footing with larger 
banks over loan terms. 
With these major findings from the interview survey, we recognize the need to 
incorporate the information on the credit-decision system at each financial institution as 
explanatory variables in empirical studies on relationship banking.  In particular, 
information such as the scope of the decision-making authority delegated to the branch 
manager, the disapproval rate of loan applications at the head office, the introduction of 
qualitative assessment items into internal credit rating, the branch office performance 
evaluation criteria, the introduction of a customer relationship management system 
focusing on the total profitability from each individual client, the emphasis on 
additional services, the training system for loan officers, and the dependence on the 
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